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Abstract 
This paper examines problems with defining the requirements for a postgraduate course in 
Information Security. It examines the concept of information and from that develops the 
components needed for a comprehensive and integrated programme. Also, it examines the 
confusion associated with the term ‘Information Security’.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper originated from an idea to create a full postgraduate programme in Information 
Security. The university concerned already had a Graduate Certificate programme in 
Computer Security consisting of four units (Computer, Information, Database, and Computer 
Facilities Security) and a research Masters in Computer Security, which had four preliminary 
units (Computer, Database, Information, and Database Security). A number of unrelated 
elements stimulated the desire to produce a new course. The first was recognition, mostly by 
students, that the units tended to overlap in content. This was especially true of Computer 
and Information Security. The second factor related to the need for an increase in the 
development of information security professionals at all levels and the fact that this cannot 
be met using the existing education in most countries (Schou, 2001). The third was the 
intake of a number of staff who had research interests in Information Warfare (Denning, 
1999; Waltz, 1998; Hutchinson and Warren, 2001a; 2001b). 
This latter aspect led to a desire to develop a more inclusive Information Security course 
based on the concept of ‘Information Warfare’. This was thought necessary to bring the 
education of Information Security out of the reactive and defensive paradigm found in many 
security courses. A unit in this subject had already been running in a Doctor of Business 
Administration programme. The idea was to expand on this concept and include all the 
aspects of information security. However, the initial problem was defining both ‘information’ 
and ‘information security’. The former was a term used by various people to mean anything 
from straight computer security to military attacks on infrastructure. It was a broad 
expression that also included in some quarters (Campen and Dearth, 2000) such people-
orient topics such as psychological warfare. In fact, Campen and Dearth would say that 
psychological warfare is the main aim of information warfare. It seemed that this broad 
expression would form the basis of the course. However, there was some concern over the 
name ‘information warfare’ as a full course. This concern was caused by a perception that 
the term was short-term fad, and also that others had (especially the military) used the term 
‘information operations’ (a slightly different concept) for much the same subject material. 
The term ‘information security’ cropped up again. It was amore conventional term and 
seemed to have a relatively distinct meaning. However, after searching texts and Information 
Security sites such as that of the Information Security Magazine (2002), it became clear that 
there was a massive overlap with conventional Computer Security. If fact, there was little to 
distinguish between them. The Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD, 2002) defines 
it thus:  
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Information security (Infosec) is usually defined as the combination of 
communications security (Comsec) and computer security (Compusec). The 
definition may also include radiation security (Radsec), which refers to 
emissions from devices such as monitors and printers (also known as 
TEMPEST). In short, the term Infosec relates to the security of any 
information that is stored, processed or transmitted in electronic or similar 
form.  
This is a totally technology and data based view. Only one text found (Pipkin, 2000) seemed 
to stray from this conventional viewpoint and actually attempt to talk about information rather 
than technology and data. 
Therefore, a decision was made to go ‘back to basics’, and examine the word ‘information’. 
The conventional definition of a data-information-knowledge-wisdom continuum did not 
prove very useful. Previous experience trying to define ‘Knowledge Management’ made the 
team realise that this model was likely to create superficial and ambiguous ideas. Another 
model was sought. The most promising model and the one eventually used and modified 
information was that created by Boisot (1998). His definition of ‘information’, ‘data’, and 
‘knowledge’ seemed the most appropriate to use and expand for this exercise.  
DEFINING ‘INFORMATION’ 
In Boisot’s model, data is associated with a thing, and discriminates between different 
states of the thing it describes. It consists of attributes of the events or objects it describes. 
On the other hand, knowledge is an attribute of an agent. Knowledge is a set of interacting 
mindsets about data activated by an event. Hence, in most circumstances the word ‘agent’ 
means a human being or a group of people. Information is the set of data filtered by the 
agent within the bounds of the knowledge held by the agent. It establishes a link between 
the agent and the data. Figure 1 illustrates the concept. This figure shows that information is 
produced by a human/group receiving data, and using a subset of that data dependent on 
the context in which it is received and the individual’s/group’s mindset/worldview. 
Using this model developed above, the basic concepts of information security can be shown. 
Figure 1 also illustrates the main attack strategies pertinent to each of the elements in 
information production. It shows the nexus between Boisot’s model and information 
security/warfare.  
The vulnerability of each component can thus be seen to be: 
Data 
If the target of an attack is the data, a number of things can be done: 
• Deny access to data: this can be achieved by attacks on hardware or systems 
containing the data or its collection, or deletion of data. As much data has a 
temporal dimension, it could also involve the delaying of access to data to the 
point at which it becomes useless. These attacks can range from denial of 
service to the deliberate withholding of data.  
• Disrupt or Destroy data: this is similar to the above, but disruption can be 
caused to the system collecting and storing the data, or to that part of the 
system, which disseminates it. Destruction of the data can occur by physical 
destruction of the storage medium, or the data itself, so it becomes irrecoverable 
in the time needed to make it useful. Of course, it can be argued that data is 
never destroyed, just the medium on which it is stored.  
• Manipulation of data: data can by added, deleted, or amended to give the 
attacker advantage. A person committing fraud would often use this method.  
• Steal data: much corporate data is confidential and can also give competitive 
advantage. Theft of this data (and remember, theft of data can go unnoticed as 
the victim could still have it) might give insights into the workings of the attacked 
thereby giving the attacker a possible business, negotiation, or criminal 
advantage. Thus, the consequences are different from the other three attack 
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methods in that ‘good’ information is unwillingly shared with unauthorised people 
or systems. 
 
Figure 1: The relationships between data, context, knowledge, information; and the methods 
by which each element can be attacked (adapted from Hutchinson and Warren, 2001b) 
Context 
The objective in altering the context of a situation is that the target will misinterpret the data 
being presented. This can be achieved by affecting environmental or sensory signals 
received by the target in any particular situation. It is similar to an attack on data but is more 
ephemeral. In attacking context, you are trying to alter the situation in which the data is 
viewed. This can include such things as place, sensory surroundings, mood, and political 
climate. It is really concerned with manipulating the way the data are to be interpreted. 
Knowledge 
The strategies to deal with knowledge tend to be more long term. As mental models are 
developed by a person’s experiences, they are created by education, social interaction, 
emotions, and so on. Changing perceptions is directed more toward the people themselves, 
and their thought processes. This can include public relations, advertising, and incentives. 
The assumption is that the attacker will exploit any situation created by the attack. This 
emphasises the need to defend human as well as technological assets as a part of an 
information security plan, something often ignored. 
Information 
Although information is now ‘created’, its dissemination can now be corrupted, stopped, or 
slowed. 
It became increasingly obvious that a comprehensive course in Information Security would 
involve more than traditional computer security. Such a course would need elements that 
included: 
• Defensive measures for data production/access/alteration/storage/destruction, 
data communication, knowledge management, data interpretation, information 
use and communication, and 
Alter mental models, eg 
education, propaganda, 
group pressure 
Deny, Destroy, Disrupt, 
Manipulate, Steal. Alter environmental, 
and/or haptic signals, etc. 
Deny actioning, 
communication to 
others. 
Attempt to alter 
context, data set. 
Context Data 
Knowledge 
Disrupt technology for 
data input, storage, 
processing and output 
 
INFORMATION 
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• Offensive measures to utilise data/knowledge/information for organisational 
benefit. 
It became increasingly obvious that a comprehensive course in ‘Information Security’ would 
involve more than a traditional computer security. 
DESIGNING THE COURSE 
The breadth of course and the need for inputs from various disciplines become apparent; 
see Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Examples of the range of topics needed in a comprehensive Information 
Security/Warfare course 
It has to be admitted that as an advanced post graduate course, more attention was put into 
the course content and desired outcomes than the means of teaching this material. It was 
thought correctly or incorrectly that as a postgraduate course, it should be knowledge 
focused rather than concentrating on the educational techniques needed.  
The discipline area was separated into ‘soft’ (people oriented) and ‘hard’ (technology 
oriented) components as implied by the Boisot model. The more generic skills required from 
all students were then determined to enable these to be integrated into the units. These 
included skills based on logic, analysis, induction, deduction, observation, cultural and 
personality appreciation, and lateral thinking. Much of this is achieved by such exercises as 
scenario, role-playing, and analytical problem solving. It was felt that these skills were an 
essential part as defensive and offensive require two separate, complementary mindsets; in 
fact, two modes of thought. One protective, suspicious, conservative, and cautious; the other 
inventive, risk taking, aggressive. Both views are needed to exploit and protect the 
information assets within an organisation.  
The subject content was then analysed. It needed to include the full breath for all students 
with the option for students to specialise in the ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ areas, or in fact, to generalise 
in both. Referring to the modified Boisot model in Figure 1, it needed to cover the elements 
of data, knowledge, context, and information protection and exploitation. As the investigation 
went on, some of the content included much of what is included in a conventional course in 
Intelligence (see LEIU, 2000 for a basic summary of an intelligence course). In fact, the 
nature of Information Security was changing to include both defensive and proactive 
(aggressive) elements resembling security (relatively passive protection), intelligence (active 
use of information), and counter-intelligence (aggressive protection of information and its 
resources). In fact, we were drifting very much into the Information Warfare/Intelligence 
paradigm. Recognising this, the course was renamed to Information Security and 
Intelligence. 
Details of content needed to cover the full breadth of the area was established and spilt into 
domain areas. The core units were designed to cover the core body of knowledge. It should 
be noted that, in this context, a unit is a component (sub course) of a complete course. The 
final course is now being offered and is split into three stages: 
Physical security, 
locks, barriers to 
entry, etc. 
Firewalls, Intrusion 
detection, 
Cryptography 
Staff vetting, 
document 
classification 
Security policy,
education 
programmes 
Environmental 
scanning, 
Perception 
Management 
Defensive Information Warfare 
Physical 
destruction 
Viruses, 
Trojan horses, 
etc. 
Hacking, 
Cracking 
Compromising 
staff/ 
communications 
Surveillance
, 
Intelligence
Psychological 
operations, 
Propaganda 
Offensive Information Warfare ‘HARD’ TECHNOLOGY 
BASED TACTICS 
‘SOFT’ (PEOPLE) 
TACTICS 
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Stage 1: Graduate Certificate 
This consists of four units: 2 compulsory core units and two electives. This stage was 
designed to cover the full gambit of factors the Boisot model (the two compulsory units, plus 
two specialist units covering an element of the model. These are basically split into 
technological ‘hard’ units such as ‘Network Security’, ‘Computer Security’, or ‘soft’ human 
oriented units such as ‘Media and Nation’, or ‘Global Communications’. The two compulsory 
units are: 
• Information Security: a general introductory unit on Information Security 
principles, concentrating on protective measures. It covers all the elements in the 
Boisot model and both hard and soft areas from the defensive side. 
• Information warfare: a general introduction to the more aggressive aspects of 
Information Security, including Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare but 
primarily the offensive. As above, it is a general unit that covers both hard and 
soft factors.  
Stage 2: Graduate Diploma 
This consists of three core and compulsory units. These cover advanced topics in the 
defensive mode (Information Security), advanced soft topics concerned with the 
mind/information interface (Perception Management), and the exploitation of information 
within an organisation (Contemporary Intelligence). The units are: 
• Perception Management: a ‘soft’ unit, which covers psychological warfare. It is 
this unit that examines the aggressive use of information. Very much about the 
data/ knowledge/ context interface. 
• Contemporary Intelligence: a ‘soft/hard’ unit, which examines contemporary 
intelligence and counter-intelligence practice. This is about the proactive use and 
defence of information. It involves all elements of the Boisot model but has 
emphasis in the Information realm. 
• Information Security: a ‘technology/ soft’ base unit, which follows on from the 
earlier unit. It tends to stay inside the defensive mode but does show the 
interface between that and the offensive mode. 
This stage provides the core of the course, whilst the former units are introductory in nature. 
Stage 3: Masters 
This stage consists of three units. There are two options: 
• Research/ Project: a research project based either from the student’s 
employment, or a theoretical based minor thesis, or 
• Three advanced units: these can be chosen from a narrow selection of units 
from computer/ network/physical security, ethics, cybercrime, or media based 
units  
This final stage allows the student to specialise by taking advanced units, or to examine their 
own organisation using the skills developed in the earlier parts of the course, or to research 
a topic of interest in the field. 
The course still covers traditional fundamental security principles (such as confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability) and in the technical computer security based units deals with those 
basic topics defined by White el al. (1999) as: 
• Risk analysis 
• Authentication 
• Access controls 
• Basic principles of cryptography 
• Knowledge of the types of malicious software that exist; 
• Basic network security (including a discussion of web security). 
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Within the non-traditional security units (for example Information Warfare), a more innovative 
way has to be used to teach the subject. The School has been involved with the Australian 
Department of Defence in running Information Warfare exercises involving Australia, 
Canada, NATO, New Zealand, United Kingdom and USA using collaborative learning (war 
gaming) environments (Davey, 2001). This has led to an understanding that newer more 
innovative teaching methods may have to be applied to teach certain key concepts. 
In this course the progression of units is thought to accomplish the difficult task of covering 
the body of knowledge required in this ill-defined field, moving away from the traditional 
defensive security norm. 
THE STATE OF SECURITY EDUCATION AND R&D WITHIN AUSTRALIA 
The course described also has a larger impact; it helps Australia and its future development. 
The Australian Federal Government department NOIE (National Office of the Information 
Economy) had been looking at the IT security situation within Australia. The aim of the 
project was to determine what the situation was within Australia in regards to IT Security 
education. The project found that the main requirements were (Aeuckens, 2001): 
1. Demand for people with security skills is expected to be strong over the few 
years. 
2. Recruitment of personnel with security skills is difficult compared to other IT&T 
skills. 
The project also identified some key issues that related to Australian organisations and the 
impact of security, these key issues were (Aeuckens, 2001): 
• Demand is rising - As security becomes an integral business issue, demand for 
skilled personnel is growing within Australia; 
• Recruitment of people with the right skill sets is difficult - The greatest difficulty 
is in recruiting people with well-rounded security and risk management skills 
(likely to include technical and business skills); 
• Security is not just an issue for security personnel - All IT personnel should have 
an awareness of security issues and their place in a business environment; 
• Limited Graduate programs - Many organisations recruited new IT graduates. 
Graduates did not generally have any specific understanding of security, 
therefore it was necessary for them to undergo further training; 
• Education and training opportunities in e-security are not widely available - The 
minimum qualification demanded by employers is generally at the Bachelor level 
but tends to lack security expertise. 
A further NOIE investigation was into security research and development within Australia. 
The NOIE research project found it was essential to ensure the long-term health of 
Australia’s E-security research for a number of reasons. (King, 2001): 
• Dependence on foreign e-security providers limits the input that Australia has into 
the type and character of products and services developed. Australia should not 
be reliant upon other countries dictating appropriate levels of security;  
• A commercial imperative also exists. A secure and trusted electronic 
environment is a necessary condition enabling electronic commerce;  
• The e-Security industry is experiencing substantial growth. R&D is an important 
link in the innovation chain driving developments in this industry sector. The 
Government has an important role to play ensuring that Australia is a global 
supplier as well as a consumer of e-security products and services. Eventually, 
some kind of security technology, be it hardware or software, will be resident in 
every networked device. Maintaining a critical mass of e-security R&D in 
Australia is essential to achieving this aim;  
• A robust e-security R&D environment can also play a key role in attracting skilled 
e-security workers to Australia, and keep home grown talent from moving 
overseas; 
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• E-Security R&D will assist in providing the Government with the tools to perform 
its role in law enforcement activities to protect information infrastructure and the 
public.  
The course described within the paper as well as the joint research undertaken by the 
authors symbolises the steps that have to be taken to resolve the problems defined by the 
Australian Federal Government. Australia faces a common problem with many countries 
within the developed world. It is that there is limited teaching of security skills within 
Australian Universities and a flawed approach to security R&D within Australia. These two 
facets have to be considered as a whole, as this defines the IT Security culture of Australia 
within the new millennium, but raising awareness across the economy of the importance of 
e-security is seen as a major priority (NOIE, 2001). 
CONCLUSION 
The exercise of developing this course better focused the participants’ thoughts on an area 
in which they were ‘experts’. Hopefully, the end product is a comprehensive addition to the 
education world, and will add to intellectual progress in this area. It does expose the narrow, 
technological bias of many security courses. Perhaps, this view reflects the general 
impression in the IT industry that data and technology are synonymous with information. The 
development of this course shows that information security is, in fact, a much richer area of 
study and research. 
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